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Response to Review of Film Worlds: A Philosophical Aesthetics of Cinema
by Swagato Chakravorty
My thanks to Film-Philosophy for inviting me to respond to Swagato
Chakravorty’s review of my book, Film Worlds: A Philosophical Aesthetics
of Cinema. I appreciate Chakravorty’s interest in the book and very much
welcome all relevant and informed criticism. Unfortunately, much of the
review falls into neither category. Along with a number of inaccurate
descriptions of parts of the text and assertions of questionable relevance, it
contains rather significant mischaracterisations and likely misimpressions.
Some of the latter appear to evidence a rather shaky grasp of certain
philosophical and theoretical terms, definitions, and movements.
In an opening salvo, Chakravorty opines that Film Worlds adds little
or nothing to film theory that cannot be gleaned from reading the works
of ‘[Siegfried] Kracauer… [Walter] Benjamin… [André] Bazin and…
[Stanley] Cavell (among others). ’ He refers specifically to what he
(erroneously) calls the book’s ‘conclusion’ that a film’s ‘ truth inheres in
“intervention in, and transformation of what we ordinarily perceive,
think, and believe.” ’
Excluding Benjamin, who wrote little on the moving image per se, a
first point to make is that the three theorists mentioned are famously
associated with a realist view of cinema. In contrast to the book’s non-
realist account of film art, their respective positions are anchored in a
photographic ontology of (celluloid) film and various experiential and
aesthetic consequences seen to follow from it. As is explicit throughout
Film Worlds, I regard such realist positions as fundamentally partial;
in themselves they are untenable bases for a better understanding of
film art in its notable diversity of styles, modes, formats, and media. Most
basically, my stated view is that, as representational artworks, films
are nothing less than experientially existing, multi-layered, and specially
constructed (albeit still ‘virtual ’) worlds, as opposed to only indefinitely
many versions, visions, or ‘views’ (in the Cavellian sense) of the (real)
world. In this way, and contrary to Chakravorty’s claim, I leave behind
the more problematic arguments of these authors, not least from the
standpoint of the now highly diverse contemporary ‘audiovisual ecology ’
that Chakravorty himself emphasizes – even if I do at times retain certain
more relevant and convincing insights from both these classical and from
more recent realist and formalist positions.
Furthermore, the quoted statement has been rather minimally extracted
from my testing of Martin Heidegger’s notion of the truth of art as
aletheia – together, and more prominently, with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
allied hermeneutic perspective – against cinematic art. (By any standard
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this is a far from ‘positivistic ’ line of inquiry.) As an even moderately close
reading reveals, it is presented as the ‘conclusion’ neither of this particular
discussion of the transformative nature of filmmaking, nor of the last
chapter in which it appears – let alone of the book as a whole. As indicated
by the title of the chapter (‘Toward an Existential Hermeneutics of Film
Worlds ’) and the comments introducing it, this is the most speculative
section of the book. Starting from a dual criterion for the greatest works
of cinema proposed by François Truffaut, the chapter’s main aim is to lay
out additional relevant subjects and perspectives as concerning filmic
truth and value in the hope of their further pursuance. In response
to Chakravorty’s suggestion that here and elsewhere I am only restating
the familiar concept of ‘defamliarization, ’ he perhaps missed my specific
explanation of why and how the intervention and transformation
in question goes beyond at least one more precise and influential
understanding of this term (p. 50). It is neither the telos of the concept of
film worlds, nor integral to many of the book’s other ideas and arguments,
the majority of which are self-contained to their respective sections
and chapters. While this is not the place to list them all, these include
a detailed application of the major American philosopher Nelson
Goodman’s aesthetics (also not ‘positivist, ’ and certainly not ‘ idealist ’)
to cinema (Chapters 4 and 5); and a new conceptual mapping of a
narrative film’s affective and emotional structure, as comprised of three
‘ local ’ category types and a ‘global ’ (‘cineaesthetic ’) world-feeling, which
is both supervenient on them and a radically emergent feature of a film’s
temporal experience (Chapters 6 and 7).
That said, what does frame and inform all of the book’s arguments,
and is reiterated throughout, is a primary distinction between what
I term the world-in and world-of films. Chakravorty either fundamentally
misunderstands or misrepresents this distinction. His puzzlement over
aspects of the book’s methodology, argumentation, and intellectual
reference points – together with a number of erroneous statements (such
as that the book advocates ‘ taking apart ’ films full stop) – may well result
from this apparent confusion.
In brief, the world-in a film is its basic representational and/or fictional
world, i.e. what is frequently referred to as the diegetic world of a film.
Contrary to the reviewer’s suggestion, the world-of a film is nowhere
claimed to be the ‘real world ’ and is specifically differentiated from it (p. 34,
for example). In fact, if it were not for this major difference there would
be no need or advantage in theorizing film worlds as something much
more than diegetic worlds. Rather, the world-of is defined throughout
as the total communicative and expressive-affective structure and
experience of a film (or its ‘modality, ’ if one likes) as a presentational,
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as well as representational, reality. As such it necessarily encompasses
(but without contradiction also clearly exceeds) the world-in, and also
includes various integrated and co-present extra- and non-diegetic, extra-
narrative, formal, and stylistic features of the sort which are often
associated with the artistic dimensions of films. Also a ‘world’ deserving
of the label, the world-of a cinematic work evidences the significant
alterity, strong holism, unique temporal and spatial properties, and
physical and experiential self-enclosure, among other features, that are
characteristic of worlds (see Chapter 2). Together with its many artistic
functions discussed in the book, the world-of, as distinct from both the
world-in (in-itself) and the real world, is also the source or ‘ location ’ of a
film’s periodic address of viewers, as theorized, for instance, in linguistic
and textual pragmatic terms by Francesco Casetti, Christian Metz, and
others.
To borrow his own phrase, Chakravorty then seems curiously to
project a ‘ locked down’ agenda of his own when he seeks greater
‘acknowledgment ’ of installation works in film theory. In terms of
this rather tangential concern, some but not all installation works
also possess on this understanding a form of represented world-in
(if not a fictional one) and certainly a presentational world-of – much
like various documentaries, experimental films and digital-video
works. Nonetheless, the relevance of Chakravorty’s comment remains
lost to me.
The reviewer is shocked at the working methodology stated in
the book’s introduction of ‘bracketing off ’ what I refer to as ‘historical,
institutional, psychological, ethical, and other ’ aspects or conditions of
films in the interest of what myself and others would consider first-order
aesthetic or artistic ones. Putting aside the fact that Chakravorty omits
to reference the qualifying ‘temporarily ’ and ‘provisionally ’ that I placed
after ‘bracketing’ in the sentence in question, I adopted a strategy that
is helpful in engaging with, clarifying, and critically expanding upon
cinema in the context of relevant aesthetic theory (as the book’s subtitle
makes clear). All of the other dimensions of filmmaking and film viewing
mentioned, as falling under the heading of culture (including film culture)
are nowhere even faintly denied but specifically and repeatedly
acknowledged (see pp. xv–xvi of the Introduction). Moreover, that
film art is always the ongoing product of the history and institutions of
the cinema is reflected in the final chapter’s appeal to hermeneutics
in order to affirm the full force and bearing of both tradition (in a
very robust sense of the term, such as that developed by Gadamer) and




I am rather perplexed by the reviewer’s bald assertion – in the context
of what he sees as the book’s conservative notions of experiential
(or ‘existential ’) and self-reflexive cinematic truth – that ‘we are some
decades past the time when judgment and taste constituted central parts
of art criticism and history. ’ No matter how much these concepts and
the criteria they include may have changed over time, I wonder upon
what contemporary art criticism is focused, then, if not matters of
taste and judgment, as per the definition of criticism itself? Whether in
the field of criticism or relevant art and film theory, the forms of truth
in question still very much exist. Furthermore, I believe it is important
to retain them as at least one sort of normative-aesthetic criterion
precisely when considering those works that represent the most
significant and influential artistic achievements in the moving image, be
they recent or past, digital or celluloid. Indeed, it is to these that my
analysis is expressly confined. Neither of the twin poles of revealed or
interpreted film world truth is fundamentally altered by recent
technological developments, not least because by stated definition
they are non-empirical and transmedial – much like the majority of the
book’s concepts and distinctions (including that between the world in
and the world of films). Such truth and related value does not,
for instance, hinge on the particular combination of indexicality and
iconicity that characterises celluloid cinema and/or its potential
psychological effects as emphasized in the realist theories discussed
above, and which some see as challenged by digital image-making,
manipulation and viewing. I assume Chakravorty to have these realities
in mind when he refers without further explanation to the ‘disappearing
medium. ’
With respect to the reviewer’s umbrage at the complete ‘absence
of Malick, ’ I should point out that Terrence Malick is mentioned in
the book. Moreover, in the book’s introduction I note the difference
between my film worlds concept and approach as a whole and at least
one account of ‘cinematic worlds ’ rooted in the Heidegger-Malick axis
and the idea of world-disclosure (p. xxii, n. 20). The stated aim of Film
Worlds is to be relevant and applicable to the works of numerous
filmmakers and styles beyond Malick. Nonetheless, Malick scholars have
already been keen to apply my ideas, as articulated in an earlier article
on film worlds, to Malick’s films and their meanings (see Yacavone 2008;
Rybin 2011).
As will no doubt be clear to the readers of Chakravorty’s review and this
response, we have notably different understandings of what Film Worlds
represents, attempts, and possibly succeeds at doing, together with its
contemporary relevance to a number of subjects in film and media theory,
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as well as philosophical aesthetics. I am happy to encourage those with
an interest in any of the topics mentioned and in this exchange to pursue
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